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Although information can be considered a normal good just as any other good 
in an economie sense, some of its aspects make it worth devoting special 
attention to it. In this article we will try to point out these aspects, 
indicate their consequences for the economics of information, review concise-
ly the state of the art in this field, and suggest directions for further 
research. 
Much has been written about information but very seldom has information been 
defined in an operational sense. In fact, apparently quite different topics 
have been studied under the heading of information. For instance, the review 
article of Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) is only concerned with information as 
a means of reducing uncertainty. In the area of information technology on the 
other hand, information is just regarded as the transmission of signals 
(OECD, 1984). According to Naisbitt (1982), in his analysis of our informa-
tion society, information is concerned with the production of knowledge. And, 
as a last example, we refer to the service sector which is sometimes also 
identified by means of the term 'information sector' (Giaoutzi and Nijkamp, 
1988). 
The common theme of these examples is that they are related to either data 
or information or knowledge, or a combination of those. These three concepts 
can be linked by means of the following definitions: 
2) Information is the meaning assigned to data by known conventions 
(Samuelson et al., 1977). 
2) Knowledge is the integration of processed information. 
With processed information is meant that the (new) information is not just 
added to the stock of knowledge the receiver already has, but that it is 
interpreted, placed in a proper context, or understood. It can be compared to 
the refinement of ore into gold. Or, as an alternative example, if we 
consider the characters of a computer program as data, then read:ng such a 
program gives information about the program, how it may solve certain 
problems; however only when it is processed, compiled in this context, it 
really works and is able to actually solve problems. 
Thus, data, information and knowledge form a sequel, in this order. Data 
however, can also be seen as the symbolic representation of information. The 
sequel is nonetheless not circular! To show this, the concept of communica-
2 
tion is needed, which can be described as the exchange of data. 
Now the previous elements can be represented as a series of successive e-
vents: information owned by economie agent A is transformed into a symbolic 
representation. These data are communicated te another agent B who assigns a 
meaning to the data. Finally agent B processes and integrates the information 
with his stock of information to enlarge his knowledge. This series of events 
can be called the communieation process. 
Figure 1 shows the communieation process excluding the final processing 
stage which is considered of no direct interest to the economist. The figure 
suggests that the same process may be described with different terras, 
depending on the perspective one has. We do not advocate here one exclusive 
perspective. In studying different aspects of the communieation process the 
most appropriate viewpoint is adopted, including the related terminology. 
Perspect ive 
Economics Supply T ranspor t De mand 
In format ion In format ion Representat ion Da'& In te rp re ta t ion In format ion 
Communieat ion Sender Coding Message Decod ing Receiver 
Figure 1 Schematic representation of the communieation process 
The entire communieation process as shown in figure 1 will be the subject of 
this article. The communieation process starts with the presence of some 
information possessed by an economie agent. Thus, at the start of the process 
we observe the owner of the information. In economie terms he is the produ-
cer (supplier) of the information, and can also be identified with the sender 
side of the communieation process. At the end of the process is the consumer, 
who is also the receiver of the information. Producer and consumer are linked 
by a transportation line which will be called a medium in the information 
context. The transformation of information into data will be labelled coding; 
the opposite, the interpretation of the data by the receiver, decoding. A 
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package of data that is sent and received is called a message. 
The non-circularity of the definitions concerning Information follows from 
two reasons. The first is that the economie agents A and B are by definition 
not the same person. The second reason is that since the information is 
transformed into data and is then again interpreted to become information, 
this information is not necessarily identical at both ends of the process. 
This may be due to an inappropriate representation or interpretation, or 
specific circumstances in which the respective owners of certain information 
use it. For instance, when two persons have different insights in the current 
exchange rate of dollars, the information that something costs $ 2.- is still 
differently perceived by these two persons. 
The above mentioned studies can now easily be related to parts of the com-
munication process. Hirshleifer and Riley focus on the consumer side, studies 
like those of the OECD deal mainly with the media, while Naisbitt's study on 
the information sector is principally concerned with the supply side. 
One property of knowledge which is important from an economie point of 
view needs to be stressed here. Information has to be represented or materi-
alized to be transported. But once it has been materialized and transferred 
to the receiver, the sender usually still has the knowledge himself. Thus 
information has not gone astray, once it has been transmitted to others. This 
is an important difference compared to the transport of physical goods. 
Such considerations on the conununication process offer many interesting 
perspectives for a study on information. In the next section the description 
of the process and its consequences will be explored in more detail. In 
Section 3 the measurement of information is discussed. In Sections 4 to 6 
three different uses of information at the reciever side are disussed, viz., 
information as an aid in decision making, information as a production factor 
and information as a consumption good, respectively. These uses more or less 
coincide with a usual classifIcation of all goods: intermediate deliveries, 
investment, consumption. Next, Section 7 is devoted to the subject of medium 
choice and Section 8 concludes the article. 
2 The Communication Process 
In this section the communication process, i.e. the transfer of information 
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from a sender to a receiver, will be discussed and it will be indicated at 
which points of this process an economie analysis is meaningfui. In the 
following sections some of these points and research already undertaken will 
be reviewed. It should be noted that in doing so a purely disaggregated 
approach is utilized. 
The information process starts with the presence of some information on the 
side of some economie agent. This agent may be a firm, a consumer, 'the 
public sector', a scientist etc. The question of how this agent has acquired 
this information will not be addressed here (mainly because the answer will 
often be that he accumulated information in the course of years or got it 
from somebody else; then this was information in an earlier stage, which may 
lead to a vicious circle). It is assumed that information means a surplus 
value to the owner compared to the non-information case. 
The owner of such information can act in different ways. Firstly, an agent 
can keep the information for himself and try to exploit it. For instance, a 
stock-market analyst who discovered some hidden facts about some firm may use 
this information to buy (or sell) the firm's shares. Secondly, the agent may 
act passively, e.g., when the stock-market analyst does not expect the price 
of the firm's shares to fluctuate enough to outweigh the transaction costs. 
Thirdly, the agent may try to sell his factual insight. The latter pos-
sibility may also relate to the scientist who tries to publish a paper in a 
journal: although financial revenues will usually be zero, there will be a 
return in the sense of personal satisfaction or increase in status. The 
attitude or reaction of the owner of the information may thus be the first 
point of study. It is also noteworthy that the passive reaction is not 
without any meaning in an economie sense. A consumer who is looking for some 
information may wish to know whether there are owners of the information not 
actively trying to sell it. 
The next decision to make is to whom the information is to be sold. In 
many cases there will just be one potential buyer, but in other cases the 
owner can decide on his own whom to offer the information. In case the owner 
indeed has a free choice, it becomes very important to what extent and at 
which costs the information can be copied. For instance, if it can be easily 
copied and resold, it should be offered to all potential buyers at the same 
time. Such considerations may be a second point of study. 
The third step to be made is the determination of the price the seller 
wants to receive for the information. This price will depend on many at-
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tributes of the information, one of which are the acquisition or production 
costs. When the information is traded in a free market only the marginal 
costs will be important. Note that these marginal costs are often very low, 
or even zero. On the other hand, in some cases, for instance in the case of 
contract research, the total production costs will be the determining factor. 
Needless to say that the determination of the price is an important point of 
study for the economist. 
The price the seller asks is not necessarily the same for all buyers of 
the information. This again depends on the possibility of copying the 
information: information is essentially non-depletable. The reason has a nice 
economie background, because selling the information means that the (pote-
ntial) supply of the good has increased which ceteris paribus means a lower 
price. 
Before the information can be transferred, it has to be coded. This is to 
a large extent a technical phase, but economics may again play a role here. 
One can imagine that in coding the information, a trade-off can be faced con-
cerning the length of the message and the possibility of a correct inter-
pretation of the message. Such questions can be analyzed with economie tools. 
The coding and decoding phases should then be handled simultaneously. 
The next step in the communication process is the medium choice. It can be 
assumed that the data can be transferred via different media. The most well-
known media are telephone, mail, telex, fax etc, but newspapers, periodi-
cals, television, radio, folders, visits etc. can be added to this list. In 
principle, all information can be transmitted by all media, at least from a 
technical viewpoint. Actually this is not very surprising because all media 
use video or audio based data. The differences stem from the costs of the use 
of the media, including preparation costs, and these can indeed become 
prohibitive. But then again these costs are just one of the many attributes 
of the media and have to be traded off against other valuable attributes. 
Section 7 of this paper will be devoted to media choice, so that a further 
discussion may be postponed here. Only one point needs to be mentioned here. 
The choice of the medium will not in all cases be made just by the seller. It 
can also be made by the buyer or by both of them in a consultation process. 
At the consumer side of the communication process, various aspects can be 
distinguished depending on the purpose of the information. Although 'the 
prime use of information is to provide a basis for decisions' (Samuelson et 
al. 1977, p. 47), other uses of information can be identified. One such a 
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possibility is that the information is merely consumed. Or the information 
may be used as an input in the production process. These different uses may 
be clarified with an example. Results of the economie division of a firm for 
instance, can be used for some investment decision. In the case of personnel 
following an educational programme, this programme can be seen as a produc-
tion factor. People reading newspapers however, are just consuming informa-
tion: they normally do not read the newspaper to take a decision, neither do 
they use the information in a production process. Each of these three ways in 
which information can be used at the receiver side will be analysed in more 
detail in Sections 4 to 6. 
3. Measurement 
A very difficult and intriguing side of information is its measurement. 
Actually two things can be measured: the amount and the value of information. 
'There is not necessarily any relation at all between these two dimensions. At 
the same time however, the costs of transmitting data will relate to its 
amount, while the price one has to pay, or the revenue one wants for the 
information, will be related to the value. 
The value of information is reflected in the price per unit of it. When the 
information is traded in a market, this price will be the result of the 
interaction between demand and supply. The way the supply price is deter-
mined is not very clear, however. Acquisition costs or production costs will 
play a role, but Standard rules like price equals marginal costs do not 
necassarily apply, because the marginal production cost of an extra unit of 
the same, identical information good is zero (although there will be costs 
involved in the transmittance of an extra message). Also when the information 
is traded, the seller still has the information. So the only reason why he 
should not be willing to sell his information is that hls trade-partner once 
having the information may cause a disutility or a loss to him. 
At the demand side the picture is somewhat clearer. The value, which 
determines the price the buyer is willing to pay, depends on the attributes 
of the information he receives. In fact, it is not the information that is 
bought, but a message that has to be decoded bef ore it can be evaluated. Thus 
it is the attributes of the message, in relation to the information the buyer 
is after, that determine the demand price. These attributes will be discussed 
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below. 
The volume of the information, the number of data that is valuable for the 
receiver, is of course one of these attributes. As will be seen below, the 
volume of information can also be determined on another basis. But first a 
short review of the existing literature is presented. 
In reviewing the literature it appears that the measurement of information 
has always been very context-specifie. Theil (1966) uses a dimensionless unit 
to measure the informational content of messages, defined as the difference 
in entropy of the probability distribution of the states of the world before 
and after the message was received. In decision theory the value of infor-
mation is calculated on basis of changes in expected utility (e.g., Hirsh-
leifer and Riley, 1979), when an optimal decision is taken again on the basis 
of a distribution function of possible states of the world. Cravis (1981) 
uses another dimensionless unit, viz. Erlangs (defined as the average arrival 
rate of demands for telephone calls, divided by the reciprocal of the average 
length of a call), to make calculations on capacity problems of telephone 
networks. AT&T (1988) however uses number of telephone calls as a measure of 
the interaction between countries based on communication. 
Concerning the volume of information a distinction has to be made between the 
various parts of the communication process. At the start and the end of this 
process we have -as described in section 1- information. However, in the 
transport phase we are dealing with data. It appears that during this 
transmission there always is a natural way of measuring the data, possibly 
depending on the context, as is inter alia reflected in the above mentioned 
Erlangs. Other measures may of course be used as well, e.g. time span of 
making telephone calls, bits in an electronic mail setting, lines for com-
puter programs, words for an article, pages for a book, time for a TV-
commercial spot etc. The common element in all these instances is a kind of 
volume which is appropriate as the basis for an economie analysis concerning 
the transmittance of information. 
Clearly however, these measures of volume are in no way the determining 
factor for the amount or value of the information to the receiver. To him the 
various attributes or characteristics of the decoded message are important. 
Probably the most important attribute is the informational content of the 
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message. In a stochastic setting, where the information concerns probabi-
lities of emerging states of the world, Theil's measure is appropriate. It is 
not very likely however, that all real world situations can be described as 
state-of-the-world problems. Reading some scientific article can be very in-
formative without changing anyone's probability distribution function con-
cerning states of the world. How then, should the informational content be 
measured? 
Before trying to answer this question, it is useful to describe some other 
characteristics of messages in order to get at the heart of the meaning of 
informational content. These attributes of course also apply to the case of 
decision theory where informational content can be well described by Theil's 
entropy measure. Firstly, there is the concept of relevance. This attribute 
can be measured as the proportion of the volume of the message which is 
directly or indirectly related to the things the receiver intended to be 
informed about. Although this is difficult to measure in an unambiguous way, 
the meaning of the concept will be clear -and so its importance- to the 
receiver. Relevance can also be seen as a kind of efficiency measure: the 
higher the relevance, the more of the message will be used by the receiver. 
A second attribute is the reliability of the message. This will to a large 
extent depend on the perceived reliability of the sender, but also on the 
performances in the coding, decoding and transmitting phases (cf. Marschak, 
1974; Amershi, 1988). In decision theory, a measure of reliability can be 
elegantly developed. Normally the prior distribution and the distribution ac-
cording to the message are multiplied and scaled so as to reach a proper 
posterior distribution: 
Ppost(x) = Ppri(x) * Pmes(x; / scale
1 (1) 
where Ppri(x), Ppost(x) and ?mes(x) refer to the prior distribution, the 
posterior distribution and the distribution according to the message received 
of the states of the world respectively. Scale is a constant defined in such 
a way that the integral of the posterior distribution function over all 
states of the world equals 1. Formula (1) is equivalent to geometrically 
averaging the prior and the message with equal weights. Now the relative 
reliability of the message can be accounted for by giving the message a 
1 We assume Ppri * 0 
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weight higher than 1 (the message is more trustworthy than the prior) or less 
than 1 (the opposite), given a weight of 1 to the prior. Or in the case that 
weights add up to 1, one arrivés at a Cobb-Douglas type of formulation: 
P p o s t O O = P p r i C * ) 1 ^ * P r » e s W f / S C a l e ( 2 ) 
with weight 0 < r < 1, where r = 0 means an absolutely unreliable message, 
while r = 1 means evidence. 
A third attribute mentioned here is the durability of the information of 
the message. This pertains to two situations. The first is the situation 
where no one e Is e has the information, but one may almost be sure that 
somebody else will receive it some time. When this time span is short, quick 
action is needed to convert the relative advantage of having the information. 
This situation is well known in the world of journalism and may also be 
labelled as an exclusivity attribute. The other situation is when the 
information is only for some time relevant because of deterioration, outdat-
ing or a changing environment. Weather forecasts are well known examples in 
this respect. 
Returning to the problem of determining the informational content of mes-
sages in a non-stochastic setting, recall that this informational content was 
assumed to be the dominant factor concerning the value of a message. It is 
cléar however, that the value of a message will in part be determined by its 
relevance, reliability, exclusivity and durability too, but that these 
attributes are something else than the informational content of a message. Up 
till now the part of the message which was not new to the receiver, (i.e., 
"old news") was not excluded from the discussion. Exactly here we have a key 
to the concept of informational content of a message which may now be loosely 
defined as that part of the message which was not known to the receiver 
beforehand. Notice that this definition can, for instance, also apply to a 
situation of confirmation of a previously received message. The informational 
content of the confirmation then applies to the news that another person has 
the same opinion (insight). Clearly, the definition is still vague and hardly 
operational, but it may prove useful as an analytical tooi for further 
analysis. 
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h. Information in Decision Making 
Economie agents take numerous decisions every day. All these decisions taken 
together establish 'the market'. Analyzing this market, economists usually 
assume that decisions are taken under perfect information or -equivalently-
in the absence of uncertainty (Varian, 1984). Stigler (1961) was one of the 
first to introducé uncertainty in an economie setting. He analyzed the 
situation of a consumer facing the possibility of producers charging dif-
ferent prices. Since then a vast body of literature concerning uncertainty 
and information has emerged, which was in the mean time reviewed by Hirsh-
leifer and Riley (1979). In this section, the economics of information is re-
stricted to the context of decision making, which is part of the whole field 
of information economics. 
The economics of uncertainty is a natural and necessary preliminary to the 
economics of information. Whenever a decision maker has complete knowledge 
about all possibilities he is facing, he just has to evaluate his known 
utility function to take an optimal decision in a predefined sense. Complete 
knowledge means he is aware of literally all possible options he might face, 
that he has perfect insight into all consequences of all possibilities 
including those of the future, that he perfectly knows his utility function 
including his time preference rate and that he also is able to predict 
perfectly the future states of the world (these too may affect the consequen-
ces of his decision and his utility function). 
It is obvious that such complete knowledge is impossible in real life, and 
in fact even in a meaningful economie analysis. Uncertainty prevails at all 
stages and parts of the decision process as described above. Economists have 
developed various ways of coping with uncertainty. For instance, concerning 
the uncertainty about the parameters of the utility functions, economists 
adopt the approach to introducé random disturbance terms. In other cases 
economists just assume the uncertainty away. Thus, it is often assumed that 
the decision maker is aware of all possible options concerning his decision. 
Though this may seem a natural assumption -decision making is choosing one of 
the available options-it is also a pragmatic one, not doing justice to real 
world situations. Similarly, perfect knowledge of the consequences of deci-
sions is usually assumed, which again is a natural but not a realistic 
assumption. For instance, in making decions concerning joining a bet that re-
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turns the stake, there is uncertainty about both the outcome, and the stake. 
Uncertainty about the emerging state of the world, the outcome in case of 
the above bet, is most often dealt with. This uncertainty is most convenient-
ly described by means of a probability distribution of the possible states of 
the world, that can be either discrete or continuous. Usually then, economics 
of uncertainty concentrates on the adaptation phase of the decision maker, in 
other words, according to his perceived distribution the decision maker tries 
to reach as good a 'position' as possible, given his initial endowment and 
prices. The position of the decision maker is then often expressed in terms 
of claims in emerging states of the world, which can be interpreted as sure 
returns in case a certain state emerges. Economics of Information on the 
other hand concentrates on the possibilities to overcome uncertainty, or more 
appropriately: to reduce uncertainty. This may also be expressed as trying to 
find a more reliable distribution function. 
Because the decision maker is still facing a distribution function after 
'the receipt of information, it is clear that the economics of uncertainty is 
an essential part of the economics of information. In general terms, the eco-
nomics of information considers three successive stages: trading in state-
claims before anyone can get some information, the information acquisition 
stage and the trading of state-claims after some (private) or all (public) 
received the information. Many interesting results were derived in the 
seminal paper of Hirshleifer (1971). 
Information acquisition is the same as the receipt plus the interpretation 
of a message in the terminology of section 1. The interpretation phase is 
often neglected in the literature (see also Marschak, 1971). This may be 
justified for the study of the decision maker, but should not be overlooked 
when the information system as a whole is studied2. 
A main and well known result from the literature is that a message or infor-
mation that is received will never lead to a reduction in the (true) expected 
utility of the receiver (see Marschak, 1954). The reason is that if a 
decision maker would have made choice d0 before he received the message with 
return r0 and if hls optimal choice afterwards would be dx with revenue ra, 
2 As an example an American producer considering whether or not to 
translate a manual in Dutch for the Dutch and Flemish market, should also 
consider the chances of correct use of his product in either case, resulting 
in satisfied customers. 
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this revenue r1 is by definition not less than the revenue he could have 
expected, choosing d0 with this expectation taken after the receipt of the 
message, i.e. using the posterior distribution. After receiving the message 
there is no point in comparing r0 with r1 because these revenues pertain to 
different situations. The expected gain of betting on horse A is of no 
interest to a person after he has heard that horse A will not run at all. But 
of course he will be glad to have heard this message because otherwise he 
might have made a bet on horse A. 
Of course the decision maker does not know beforehand which message he 
buys, as otherwise he would not have to buy it. A more general model is 
therefore that the decision maker purchases an information service instead of 
a single message (see Marschak and Miyasawa, 1968) . The information service 
is characterized by a set of possible messages one of which is actually sent 
to the decision maker. It is important to note that the set of possible 
messages is assumed known to the decision maker. The messages consist of 
distributions of states of the world. With some statistical tools it is 
possible to derive the possibility of receiving a message, given the prior 
beliefs of the decision maker. And because every message results in a non-
negative return, it follows that every information service has a non-negative 
a priori expected value, that can be compared with the costs of purchasing it 
(see Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979). 
In this concept of information services almost automatically a stage of 
perfect information was introduced, viz. the knowledge of the set of possible 
messages. This is similar to the assumed knowledge of all possible states of 
the world noted earlier, and the same remark applies here. But although this 
may be an unrealistic assumption in real life situations, in analyzing the 
decision making process, the emergence of disregarded options means essen-
tially a badly defined problem. 
The attributes introduced in the previous section to characterize messages 
are not very elaborately discussed in the literature about information and 
decision making. Marschak (1971) discusses the implications of introducing 
delays that may happen in information or Communications systems. He observes 
that due to the presence of delays it may be preferable to buy less accurate, 
but more recent information. Delays become important in case information can 
become outdated or deteriorated. 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) discuss the confidence of the decision maker 
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in his o m prior distribution. This is of course counterparted by the 
attribute of reliability of the message. Their method of dealing with 
confidence is less satisfactory as they describe confidence as the tightness 
of the prior, by which they mean the variance of this distribution. This, 
however seems to be more related to the problem at stake than to the con-
fidence of the decision maker. Consider for instance a random number genera-
tor. One can just believe that this generator draws numbers independently and 
according to the uniform distribution from the interval 0 to 1. But after a 
thourough analysis of 1000 drawings of such numbers one can come to the same 
conclusion. In either case the variance of the prior is the same, but 
certainly the confidence in the prior is much larger in the second instance. 
Therefore we prefer our treatment of the concept of reliability as proposed 
in section 3 (eq. (2)). 
Marschak (1971) introduces the concept of informativeness of the previous-
ly introduced Information service. Informativeness relates to the extent to 
which different messages of the information service differ from each other. 
In Marschak's model messages are said not to differ if they lead to the same 
choice (action) in the decision problem. The most informative information 
services are those for which each message assigns a probability of 1 to one 
of the options. Thus this informativeness is a measure of information 
services consisting of messages applying to the same decision problems and is 
therefore not comparable to what we meant above in our discussion of the 
informational content of a single message. 
5. Information as a Production Factor 
The classical production function in economics relates output to two inputs, 
labour and capital. Depending on the field of study, extensions are some-
times made including variables representing land, technological progress or 
energy in the specification of the production function. In this section we 
investigate the possibility to take account of information used in the pro-
duction process. 
Porat (1977) states that production is "(...) the transformation of matter 
and energy from one form to another. (...) Manipulation of matter and energy 
would be impossible without a sizable input of knowledge, planning, coor-
dination, and control information" (p.2). Three quite distinct kinds of 
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information can be distinguished in the production process. The first is 
information resulting from the research and development activities of the 
firm. These activities are directed to the invention of new products or 
production processes. Machlup (1980) calls this socially new information as 
opposed to subjectively new information.3 Socially new knowledge is know-
ledge which was not known by anyone else before and so strictly refers to 
inventions and discoveries. Research however, should be slightly wider in-
terpreted.as this may also include activities related to copying existing, 
but patented products or processes. The second kind of information relates 
to administration and internal communication activities, such as planning 
and control. As a third kind of information present in a firm, we consider 
the educational level of personnel and the technological state of production 
capital. In this case we agree with Machlup that this is in fact knowledge, 
rather than information. However, the increase in these two variables is ac-
complished by buying information, perhaps incorporated in new machinery. We 
will discuss these three informational devices now in greater detail. 
The organisation of a firm is very important. A good organisation results 
in short communication lines between management and production workers, 
leading to effective operating. Also an accurate administration leads to a 
good -and moreover timely- insight in the performance of the firm. Thus, 
investing in a good internal informational infrastructure may be profitable 
in various respects. This field of economics may be referred to as 'manag-
ement information systems' (see e.g. Thierauf, 1987; Parker and Benson, 
1988; Bemelmans, 1984). It should be noted that this kind of information 
production does not appear in usual statistical accounts of an economy, so 
that their relative importance for an economy cannot be assessed easily. 
Porat (1977), following Machlup (1962), developed a framework to estimate 
the share of informational activities in an economy and found for the US 
economy in 1967 that these amounted to 46% of the national product'' . From 
3Machlup in fact makes a strict distinction between information and 
knowledge and should have used the word knowledge in this case. In his view 
the word information only has to do with the act of informing by means of 
messages; he considers the content of a message as knowledge. This differs 
from the definitions of these phenomena given in section 1. Also we are less 
concemed with a linguistically correct use of words as long as our state-
ments can not be misinterpreted. 
AIt should be stressed that Porat considers all kinds of informational 
activity in this figure, including the manufacturing of computers etc. Ne-
vertheless this result once more underlines the importance of information in 
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the same source it can be computed that 65% of its total demand was used as 
an intermediate input in the production process. 
The stock of knowledge embodied in a firm is determined by the education-
al level of the labor force and the technology of the capital. The growth of 
both is accomplished by the acquisition of information. This statement will 
be quite clear for the case of education of personnel, but in general not 
for the technology embodied in capital. Yet buying machinery of a new 'tec-
hnological vintage' can be traced back to the acquisition of some form of 
information, though it may be incorporated in the machine. This means that 
the technical growth rate, embodied or disembodied, may also be considered 
as an informational investment rate. Consequently, this rate depends on the 
investments of the firm in education and training and on the rate' of invest-
ing in new capital, and thus it is in fact an endogenous variable. Rouwehdal 
and Nijkamp (1989) have recently investigated the effects of endogenizing 
R&D on the performance of firms in a theoretical setting. Another example of 
a model in which the rate of technical process is (partly) endogenized is 
the vintage model of the capital stock of an economy (Solow, 1962). 
Usually a distinction is made between labor augmenting and capital aug-
menting technical growth. In the above setting this is certainly a useful 
distinction. Moreover, it can be argued that both growth rates may not di-
verge too much. A typist who has to start working with a text processor may 
need some educational training. If not, the investment in the text processer 
may turn out to be counter-productive. 
Again, the informational content of investments embodied in machinery 
cannot be easily determined, as we defined it implicitly as a surplus value 
of the investment in a new machine over an investment in a machine com-
parable to the old one. In this respect investments in education will be 
much clearer to assess and to evaluate. 
Research and development activities aim at the same goal as the former 
kind of information, viz. technological progress in the sense of reaching 
higher productivity with the same capital and labor inputs. But there are 
some marked differences. First and foremost there is the risk of failure 
inherent in R&D: a certain line of research may appear to be a dead end, it 
may be impossible to develop an idea, or it may be too expensive to utilize 
it on an industrial scale. On the other hand, a successful innovation gives 
an economy. 
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a relative advantage over the competitors with all opportunities and risks 
involved. Of course, there are always risks involved, because there is un-
certainty whether the consumers will like a new product, or whether factor 
prices will remain the same. 
There is also a welfare dimension in the R&D activities. The argument 
that information can be bought in the form of investments in new machinery 
is dependent on a 'deus ex machina' kind of technological progress. That 
means, at least someone has to invest in R&D activities. It may even be 
assumed that the rate of technical progress an economy faces is by and large 
determined by the aggregate expenditures of the economy in R&D. Thus it may 
be profitable for an economy to favour private R&D investments by tax faci-
lities or by (partial) protection of inventions. Some recent research en-
deavours on R&D impacts can be found in Davelaar (1989) and Goei (1990). 
6. Information as a Consumption Good 
Much information is transmitted and received without explicitly serving one 
of the goals of the former two sections. In those cases information is just 
consumed; referring to Porat's work once more, in 1967 35% of all informa-
tion produced was consumed (Porat, 1977). Obviously all information received 
may influence decisions to be made in the near or distant future. For in-
stance, though newspapers are generally considered as consumption goods, 
reading newspapers can influence the choice to enter the stock market some 
day. The key point in distinguishing this kind of decision making from that 
described in Section 4, is that the information is not sought by the recei-
ver for a well defined decision problem. This description of consumption of 
information does not exclude the case of having a question answered or ful-
filling one's curiosity. In these cases however, one is not solving a deci-
sion problem and therefore we say that the information is consumed. In this 
section the characteristics of information as a consumption good will be 
discussed. 
In this discussion it is useful to stress the relationship between informa-
tion and message once again (cf. Section 1). Conceptually the difference 
between these two is clear, in the context of production and consumption 
this distinction may become confusing. Does a publisher of newspapers sell 
either information or messages (newspapers)? His main concern will be the 
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number of newspapers he is selling, but the consumer is interested in the 
informational content of the newspaper. This discrepancy appears in many 
instances in the field of Information production and consumption. Moreover, 
it is quite essential for an economie analysis, because the marginal value 
of the newspaper to the consumer is determined by the informational content, 
while the marginal cost to the producer is determined by the printing and 
distributing cost of the newspaper. 
Another example concerns the case of telephone calls between households, 
i.e. two consumers. It may be assumed that both, or at least one of them, is 
informed during the call which is a benefit to him. This information however 
is usually f ree, the only thing being paid for is the use of the telecom-
munication service, and it is not clear beforehand whether the informed 
person or the informing person pays. Also the characteristics of the message 
(e.g. its length) determine the price of communicating instead of the char-
acteristics of the information (such as its informational content). 
Regarding the price of information it can be observed that much informa-
tion is apparently offered f ree of charge. For instance, much information 
provided by the public sector is free. Also television and radio broadcasts 
are free, at least there is no direct link between subscription fees and the 
specific programmes one consumes. It may therefore be concluded that in such 
cases the sender of the information will benefit from the transmittance. But 
in that case there is no invisible hand on the market to regulate it to 
reach a social (Pareto) optimum, because consumers are usually not in a 
situation to play their role in this information game, as the supply side is 
dominating the information scène (e.g. witness the often unwanted delivery 
of advertising material to households). 
7. Medium Choice 
In order to transmit information communication means are needed. These in-
clude such media as telephone, maii, facsimile, periodicals etc. Most mes-
sages -the communicable form of information- can be sent by making use of 
many, if not all, of these media. However, in most cases only one of these 
media will actually be chosen. The present section is concerned with this 
medium choice problem. 
Medium choice can be studied at two levels, the macro and the micro level. 
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First we consider the macro level. At this level attention is mainly di-
rected to market shares and the influence of technological change on the 
relative attractiveness of the various media. Especially this latter subject 
has attracted a great deal of attention as a result of the rapid advances 
made in this field. However, it is not only the enlarged choice possibili-
ties which are noteworthy to the economist. The introduction of computer 
technology in the field of telecommunication, telematics for short, has had 
a dramatic impact on the possibilities to disseminate Information as such. 
It is illustrative that the first chapter of Naisbitt's famous study (Nai-
sbitt, 1982) is devoted to the transformation of the industrial society to 
the information society. Also from a more serious viewpoint the subject has 
drawn much attention; for instance in 1982 the OECD organized a conference 
about 'changing market structures in telecommunications' (OECD, 1984). Fi-
nally, the impact of technological advance in telematics on regional devel-
opment has been discussed in Giaoutzi and Nijkamp (1988). 
At the micro level the medium choice problem may be studied in much the 
same way as the transportation choice problem: the structures of the pro-
blems are remarkably similar. In both cases the individual faces a discrete 
choice set out of which he has to choose one alternative. The alternatives 
can be described by their attributes which may be either discrete or con-
tinuous5. It is assumed that the choice is also influenced by the charac-
teristics of the individual. Such models are classified as discrete choice 
models (see Amemiya, 1981; Maddala, 1983; Fischer et al., 1990b). The trans-
portation choice problem has been studied by many researchers, among others 
by Domencich and McFadden (1975) and Quandt and Baumol (1966). Fischer et 
al. (1990a) use a discrete choice model to study the medium choice problem 
in a universities contact context, viz. the logit model. 
Moore and Jovanis (1988) integrated the medium choice problem in analy-
zing the interactions between telecommunication and transportation. In their 
very interesting paper they present a integrated framework for this interac-
tion problem, of which the medium choice problem is a part. The medium choi-
ce problem is then discussed elaborately using a scheme which is given in 
Figure 2. This figure shows that the medium choice is determined by two 
factors: the characteristics of the message and the sender, and the (per-
ceived) attributes of the medium. These two factors lead to a media prefe-
5 For a fundamental analysis of the characteristics model, which has 
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Fig. 2. Integrated framework for communication/transportation interactions: B. The media choice 
model. 
Sorce: Moore and Jovanis (1988). 
rence ordering which, confronted with situational constraints, leads to a 
medium choice. 
Moore and Jovanis stress that the medium choice is very context speci-
fie, i.e. the choice does not only depend on the medium but also on the 
message. It is the requirements of the message to be transmitted, compared 
with the (perceived) characteristics of the various media that determine the 
medium choice. This may seem a quite obvious statement but it has a serious 
impact on the empirical part of medium choice research. It follows that it 
is very difficult to carry out a revealed preference kind of study, because 
not only the factual medium choice has to be reported on, but also the char-
acteristics of the message, ^nd the perceived characteristics of the media. 
Therefore a stated preference study is recommended (cf. Fischer et al., 
1990a). It should be noted that this problem does not emerge in transporta-
tion choice analysis because in this field the choice problem is often quite 
homogeneous, e.g. when the home-work trip is studied. Stated preference 
methods have among others thouroughly been discussed in a special issue of 
the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (1988). Cleraly stated prefe-
20 
rence methods are a good means in the study of medium choice, provided they 
are carefuliy constructed. The design of stated preference experiments in-
deed needs much attention as can be concluded from a article by Fowkes and 
Wardman (1988) in the above mentioned special issue. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Two interesting subjects have not been discussed because of the individual 
approach we adopted in the previous sections. We note them briefly here. 
The first subject is information networks, like telephone networks. A 
number of questions arises in this field. How must the price be determined 
for the use of the network? Notice that the fixed costs of a network are 
quite large, but that the marginal costs are relatively small. Which condi-
tions should apply for a link of the network to be deleted from or added to 
the network? Which capacity should be kept? Also welfare-theoretic conside-
rations may apply to information networks. For instance, it is often argued 
that postal services as a public good should be offered to all citizens, but 
then questions may arise whether, for instance, this should also apply to 
telephone lines. And, as a last example, how should the total information 
stream be optimally organized? 
The second observation is that information will sometimes just be a com-
plement to other economie phenomena. For instance when one wishes to compare 
prices in different shops, this is not because of the virtue of the prices 
themselves but because one wants to buy a product as cheap as possible. In 
fact two of the three possible uses identified earlier, viz. information for 
decision making purposes and information as a production factor, establish a 
direct link between the communication process and other economie processes. 
In other cases however, (tele-)communication may appear to be a substitute 
to travel. Teleconferencing is an outstanding example in this field. Salo-
mon (1986) has analyzed this substitution-complementarity problem of com-
munication and travel in greater detail. 
Information can be considered a normal good just as any other good in a 
economie sense. The main difference is that information is not physical. But 
when one starts considering the materialization of the information (which is 
a message), the difference tends to become less clear. Thus, from a theore-
tical viewpoint there is no evident reason to develop a new theory for the 
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market for messages (i.e. the field of (tele-)Communications). Although 
there is no need for a special theoretical treatment of the Communications 
market, this does of course not imply a neglect of the market in an economie 
sense, as it indeed is an interesting market as its economie meaning is 
rapidly growing and it is facing amazing technical progress. 
Taking account of the peculiarities of information, the study of the 
subject can take many directions. Most widely discussed, also in this paper, 
is information in the field of decision theory. Other fields are R&D, educa-
tion, communication medium choice, and estimation óf the part of information 
activities of the total of economie activity. In our view however, the re-
search issues discussed in this paper, do in most cases not take account of 
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